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JAPANESE Fil可ANCIALLIBERALIZATION 
一－ToWhere I白 Go旬g一
Denms C. McComac 
“From the standpoint of the national economy, fin阻 cialhberaliza-
tion is constructive in that it wil create a mo回 efficientJapanese 
financial system, as well田 ensuring血esmooth allocation of 
financial田sources. . . Rapidly liberalizing the Japanese fmanctal 
market, however, would confuse世田 creditorder曲目 isfunda-
mental to the nation's stability. Furthermore, fmancial i回目白首ons
would not be able to fulfi出 theirsocial responsibilities.”叫
The changing economic environment of也e1970s following the First 
011 Crisis and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Accord significantly 
1Inpacted on世田自n阻 cialsystems of血em勾orindustrialized nations. 
In the United States, the monetary authorities' inability to cope wi血
inflationary pre田uresand由edisintermediation effects of Regula世on
Q, put p問団ureon the U.S. government to deregulate capital and money 
markets. Meanwhile, as the Japanese public authorities were forced to 
seek alternative ways to fmance ever-increasing fiscal deficits the forces 
of fmanc1al liberalization were put mto motion. In an earlier paper, 12 
while investigating in detail世田econonucconchtions that fostered hberal-
ization of Jap叩 esefinancial markets, it was noted也副首iepace of 
liberalization in Jap阻 hasnot paralleled吐iatof its economic counter-
parts despite Japan’s emergence as世田 world’slargest creditor nation. 
The o句ectiveof this study is two-fold：呂田t，也epaper w出田町凶nesome 
of也emore important changes也athave occurred in financial markets; 
and second, 1t w出mvestigatethe factors也athave hindered the further 
development of Japan’s缶iancialsystem. By doing so, it wil shed light 
on血e白血recourse of the liberaliza坦onproce田．
Zθ 
I. Developments in the Money Market 
The first step in the hbe四lizationof Japan’s fin四 cialmarkets took 
place in 1976 wi血血eoficial recogni世田bythe Ministry of Finance of 
世間 gensakimarket for government bonds."' The next step occurred in 
1977 when official authorization w田 grantedto banks to sel govern-
ment bonds in the secondary market. This hastened the expansion of 
the secondary market and as a result, shifted funds away from those 
marke包 hmtoncallycharacterized by mterest rate阻 dportfolio con-
str記a担． This shift in funds provided吐田 impetusfor the monetary 
au血oritiesto move towards deregulating deposit rates, and in May 
of 1979, floating-rate certificates of deposits (CD) were introduced. 
Al由oughrestrictions on issue mcluded such things拙 anunimum de 
nommation of ¥500 m瑚10n,maturity periods of up to six mon血S皿d
a ceilmg of 10% of a b叩 k’snet worth, nevertheless, th包 freeingof 
deposit rates signaled the end of the stnctly controlled interest阻te
policies of世田postwarera 
Fmancial hberalization of the money market proceeded at a gradual, 
but cautious pace for the next five years with developments that in-
eluded the further lifting of interest rate controls on large denomination 
deposits血 dincreased access to the cal and bill-discount market by 
previously restricted financial institu世間s.
One of血emost s1gnific叩 tchanges也athas taken pla田 du血E也e
p田tdecade has been the implementation of m皿yof the measures 
recommended in the Joint US-Japan Ad Hoc Group on the Yen/Dollar 
Exchange Rate, Finance and Capital Market Issues. Primarily instituted 
to create an international role for the yen, thus pushing up 1臼valueto 
cope with Japan's growing trade surplus, the accord served to foster 
continued deregulation in the money markets. 
In e町ly1985 interest rate controls on al large-denommation deposits 
were lifted by the Ministry of Finance. This was followed by both a 
reduction in血eminim 1m deposit requirement and a decrease凱 the
Ieng血 ofma白rityon time deposits (TD) and certificates of deposits. 
In addition, a market for money market certificates 例MC)was newly 
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opened.明ienoriginally propo田d由emmimum deposit requirement 
was set at ¥50 million, but the current m1mmum was subsequently 
reduced to ¥10 million Each deposit pays a variable rate of interest 
0.75% below the current rate on CDs, and wi吐lashort-term maturity of 
one to six months, the MMC is，泊effect,a small denommation certifr勾
cate of deposit 
Further liberalization in the money market h出 includedthe relaxa-
ti on。frestrictions。nyen-denominated banker’s acceptance (BA) and 
con 
were given permission, commencing泊June1985, to foロnallyparticipate 
m血eBA market. And in December 1987 both banks and security 
hou田swere allowed to begm underwriting yen-denominated commercial 
paper (CP). The greatest significance of也isdevelopment is也抵抗
pushes the limits on Article 65 of the Security and Exchange Law which 
sep町atesthe ac!Jvities of banks and securities comp田ties.Should也is
law be officially appealed it is expected to have a m句orimpact on the 
financial marke包ω
Along with the changes in short-term money market instruments, 
the Tokyo Offshore Market was opened in December 1986 to authorized 
foreign exchange banks. This w田 establishedto create a market in which 
non-Japanese investors could par祖国pateunimpeded by世田restnctions
imposed m the domestic market The market, however, has not yet 
attained血estature of other offshore markets.'" The Ministry of Fi-
nance, for example, has placed limitat10ns on the movement of funds 
from offshore to domestic accoun匂 toprevent a loss of control over 
the money supply. This, along with也eimposition of corporate and 
local taxes on these offshore transactions has been responsible for 
dampening the enthusiasm of overseas mvestors. Most of the transactions 
in也ismarket have been lintited to those between Jap阻 esebanks阻d
until these obstacles are elim加ated,it is believed the participation of 
foreign ins世相tionswill remain mmimal 16 
The above market-opening measures notwithstanding，也emoney 
markets continue to be plagued by institutJonal rigidities. The yen-
denommated banker's acceptance market has remained small because 
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of procedural complexity四 d也ennpo困lionof stamp du ties. m The 
minimum den白nmationrequirement on CDs, TDs, and MMCs remains 
beyond the reach of most small investors and progre田恒 thederegula-
tion of interest rates has been mixed at b田t.The official discount rate, 
prime lending rates，四dgovernment・bondissue pric田（whichdetermine 
the yield on these asse担） continue to be fixed by the Bank of Japan 
or the MinIStry of Finance. The interest rate on some 75%。fthe total 
sum placed in banks' time deposits IS stil controlled."' 
Smal・・4』・nominationDeposits 
One area in which liberalization has been particularly minimal is曲目。fsmall-denomina祖ondeposits. Interest rate ceilings continue to rem田n
in effect for these deposits and future deregulation remains uncertam 
The prmcipal factor contributmg to the maintenance of mterest rate 
ceilings on small-denominat10n deposits IS也ecomplex regulatory 
aspec臼ofthe Japanese financial system. 
The speed and degree of regulation is influenced by the differing goals 
of the various regulators; namely the Bank of Japan, the Ministry of 
Fmance and the Mmistry of Posts and Telecommunicat10ns. Each regula-
tory body appe町sto seek to protect血ewell・beingof its consti白ent
body resultmg in a conflict among regulators.旬｝
The Bank of Japan, concemed出atintemalization of血eyen may 
weaken its ability to control the money supply, is hesitant to rapidly 
liberalize the international market The Ministry of Finance, however, 
favors a more rapid liberalization, perhaps, as Car自由” notes,because 
the MI凶stryof Finance is more susceptible to U.S. pressure. Jntemal 
conflict exists withm the Ministry of Finance as a result of血ecom-
petition between the banking and Postal Savings System (PSS). While 
the Ministry of Finance包 responsiblefor much of the regulation of the 
b叩随時sectorit is also dependent on the Postal Sa-吋ngsSystem and 同
large control of a田e臼，＇＂ as the major sour田 offunds for the Mmistry of 
Finance's Trust Fund Bureau. These funds are distributed to institutions 
slich as public corporations, local public bodies, special corporations, and 
a number of government白1阻 cialinstitutions (Export-Import・ Bank, 
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Japan Development Bank, People’s Fmance Corporation, etc.), al of 
which have played an加port阻 trole in the economic development of 
Japan." Thus，出eMimstry of Fmance is reluctant to reduce the role 
of the PSS, even也oughat the s田net加eit is under increasing pressure 
from the banking sector to do so. 
The Postal Savings System, with over 22,000 br阻 ches nationwide, h酷
been able to become extremely competitive with the banking system and 
h田 evenbeen allowed to pay higher interest rates由阻 theba叫也lg
establishment to attract customers. Even血叩ghabolishment of the 
ma.畑1yusystem in April 1988 has lowered the rate of旭町easein deposits, 
the Postal Savings System continues to enioy widespread political阻 d
public support . The one negative effect of也eabolishment of tax-free 
status on these accoun臼 isthat H has forced the postal saVJngs author-
ities, the Mirustry of Posts and Telecommunications, to resist a revision 
of也eregulations governing fixed-amount postal deposits. However, the 
reVJsion of this fornd-amount system is副1absolute prerequisite to 
liberalizat10n of mterest rates on small deposits.”Ohnishi " notes也at
the ostensible reason the Ministry of Fmance has given foreign bank 
m阻 agersfor not deregulating postal rates is也atsome Japanese hve on 
remote islands without access to banks and need post offices田 asource 
of savings. But世田 realreason hes behind the fact也ata portion of 
postal savings deposits are used to fund the government's debt and百
interest rates were based on market rates, it would ralse the cost of 
servicing the government's debt. 
Despite血ehindrances to liberalization listed above, Wロight阻 d
Pauh " believe血ata major source of pressure from within Japan for 
further deregulat10n IS the Japanese consumer of fm阻 ci叫田町ices,who, 
“increasmgly frustrated by low rates of return, lack of flexibility，阻d
the. very limited variety of fmancial instruments available, will demand 
a first-rate fmancial system to match a first-clas economy." 
Il. Breakdown of Market :Segmentation 
・ The highly-segregated fm叩cialsystem血athas been cited出血
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important contributor to the stab血tyof the financial system during the 
high growth period has also come under inc回国ingP自由urefor change 
from both external and internal forces. The slowdown血thegrow廿1rate 
of the economy and increased acce唱 tothe international capital markets 
by the corporate sector has reduced overall loan demand in the domestic 
market. This h田 spurredincreased compel!!Jon WI血 thebankiiig sector 
itself as the various h叩 Cialmstitutions, partic叫arlycity banks, begm to 
encroach on each other’s domain. 
The group which has suffered the most as a result of this a邸ressive
exp叩 sionof city banks has been the small and medmm-size fmanc1al 
泊stitut10ns.Tradttionally, these firms have lent to small and medium・size
firms, but now city bar血 accountfor over one-half of funding needs. 
Hinterhauser伺speculates出atfor smaller泊S首相tionsthe worst is yet to 
come. He a ttnbu tes廿tisto世田 futurede田gulaticinof retatl deposits 
which would seve田lyl!Ilpact on血eirrecur血 Eprofits; and concludes 
that over世田 next五veto ten years m四yof these institu!Jons will be 
taken over by larger banks. 
羽田 commercialbanking establishment (primarily city banks) has also 
begun to exp皿d凪tothe market for long-term f叩 ds.Under current 
law long term credit b剖武scan JSsue fixed-interest five-year debentures 
as necessary, but city banks are limited to accepting deposits for a maxi-
mum of only吐rreeyears In reality, however, over世古typercent of 
city banks' loans have a ma同ntyof more th皿 threeyears.帥
The city banking establishment, spurred by z白 recentincreased 
involvement担 long-termlendmg and by i担desireto tap Japan’s lucra-
tive pension market, has been actively camp血g由1gwithin the Finance 
Ministry for the liberalization of long-term fund procurement. They 
argue血at也is“m1smatchmg”oflending and borrowmg hurts the bank’s 
pro白tab出ty.Long-term credit and trust banks are adamantly opposed 
to any change, clam泊Ethat the commercial banking sector does not have 
the exper世間 todeal in long-term fmancmg阻d也at阻yintrus10n on 
the Ir“temtory”would harm the health of the mdustry." 
In response to the pressure to open up廿ielong-term markets to city 
banks，出eF加四ceMinistry’S Financial Systems Research Council 
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released a report in December 1987 which specifically addressed the 
questions of 1) allowing al banks to engage加世田 m四 agementof 
Japan’s pens10n白nds，剖1area血atis now restricted to世田 ninetrust 
banks, 2) permitting city banks to participate in long-term lending, an 
area officially g叩 tedto long-term banks, and 3) allowing banks to 
engage泊 securitiesdealing and underwriting." 
Legislation concerning the above is凹 esh田 notyet been formally 
enacted, and it 1s expected .to generate a great deal of debate before 
anything becomes oficial. In particular, the third propo岨labove would 
be st即時lyopposed by securities firms as they are now restricted from 
engaging m barホingactivities under Article 65. 
m.羽田Sta加sof Fo田ignFirms 
The one market in which liberalization h田 progressedat a fairly rapid 
pace is that of international capital transactions. In December 1980也e
Foreign Ex ch四 ge阻 dForeign Trade Control Law (FE円 CL)w田 com-
pletely re羽田din what Colin Jones termed“an al embracmg and epochal 
reversal of policy .. Whereas pre・吋ouslythe田 transactionswere subject 
to control unless specifically deregulated, thenceforth al were de-
regulated unless specifically controlled”τh factors contribu血 Eto 
this internationalization of fm皿cec回 befound in both the move from 
a fIXed-exchange rate system to也efloating rate system叩 d吐iech阻 ging
pattern of the flow of funds. First, the floating rate system encouraged 
the development of a sophisticated fo田ignexch血 gemarket dealing凪
spot and forward exch四getr皿sac世間s.Th担stemmedfrom世田町cesト
sity for也ebusiness sector to hedge foreign exchange risks. As the 
Japanese economy JOined the fellow ranks of也eworld’S industrialized 
economies the demand for yen as a reserve currency grew. 
Second, the end of也ehigh growth period reduced the demand for 
funds by the domestic corporate sector皿dforced domestic financial 
institutions to seek alternative sources of lending. One such altema・世間
W出回exp佃 sionof yen-denominated loans abroad.百lisled to Japanese 
fm阻 cial担副知世onsexp組出ngoperations over田国四dat世田 same
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time fo田ignbanks in Japan saw也eirr阻geof activities exp四dand 
diversify. 
For foreign firms, improved access tu capital markets has been made 
on two fronts; 1）血rough也eg印刷gof permission for foreign b町立泊g
ms ti同世onsto have securities afiliates，皿d2) an mcrease m foreign 
securities firms share allotment of new issues of government debt. 
The first development is particularly significant m也atit provides 
foreign b白水担g凪sti加世onsM由 greateraccess to也esecurities market 
th皿 thatafforded the Japanese banking establishment. For example, 
担 1985foreign banks were granted permi四onto own up to fifty per-
cent of a securities afiliate in Jap皿；effectivelyallowing foreign bank-
ing insti加tionsto deal in both banking and securities activities. Japanese 
b出水卸.ginstitu世ons,me四.while,are limited to 1ust five percent owner-
ship and are also皿句ectto Article 65 of也eSecurities四dExchange 
Law. 
The legislation regarding increased ac回国 to也egovernment secunty 
market is important in that it loosens the grip on吐tismarket by the 
syndicate of Japan田ebanks and secunties companies Pnor to也e
official recognition of a secondary market for gove口四1entdebt m 1978, 
the terms of al Jap皿esegovernment debt was negotiated by血egovern-
ment and也esyn也cate阻 d,in加rn,each member received a pre-
determmed share.'" 
The method of issuing debt posed a problem for fo問ignfirms desiring 
to enter世由 marketas they were generally not p町tof廿tissyndicate. 
This placed foreign firms at a compe世世間 disadvantagenot just 回世田
government market itself but m other markets as well because of the 
important linkages between government securities and other sec町1ties
羽田 M泊istryof F泊皿ce’sdecision in 1986 to担問ea proportion of 
short and medium ・term bonds by auction proV1ded the rmtial opportu-
nity for foreign firms to enter也egovernment bond market. Subsequent 
market-opening measures, such as mcre世田Ethe share・ of new issues 
available to foreign firms四 dexp an必ng世田auctionsystem to include 
the all-important iO-year bond, have also been forthcoming For a long 
time, however.，吐1eshare of Japanese government debt underwritten by 
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forei伊 firmsremained slight. This is in sharp contr田tto出efact也at
Japanese have bid for as much as half of some new U.S. Treasury issues, 
and that世田eof世田 40primary dealers in U.S. government secu口ties
are Japanese corporations.” 
Finally, in September 1988，世ieMinistry of Finance took a bold step 
towards competition担 thegovernment bond market when 1t announced 
a four-fold me自由ein世田 proportionof government bonds也atc阻 be
bid on by foreign firms. This wil enable foreign firms to become major 
players in the underwriting syndica胎皿dmoves也egovernment bond 
market towards an auction system. The market, as oppo田dto govern-
ment forces, wil then be allowed to deteffiline the pnce of世田bonds.
An interes首ngaspect of世田 openingup of the domestic market to 
cross-border capital flows w田 itseffect on吐ieforeign b田ikingestablish-
ment. Prior to也enew FEFTCL, domestic corporations desiring to 
obtain a fo回igncurrency loan (called impact lo皿s)were forced to加m
to也eforeign b印刷ngsector回世田 domesticfinancial sector w田 for-
bidden to provide these types of lo田s.At白紙世me,some of the m句or
United States’and European bariks derived 40% of their mcome from 
impact lo四 s.With the lifting of restrictions under吐ierevised foreign 
exchange law, the profit and lending a凶itiesof the foreign banking 
sector w田 dealta severe blow from吐iemcreased competition from吐ie
domestic田ctor. L1beralizatlon meant the loss of the old lucrallve 
monopolies-impact lo叩 s once 叫oyedby the foreign b阻凶E
establishment. Heighted compe甘tionand low dem皿dfor loans have 
made tradit10nal b佃組ng泊 Japana low profit endeavor. At the end 
of 1982, for ex田nple,foreign ba此sheld 4.2% of the loan market in 
Japan. As of August, 1987, however, the share had shrunk to 2.2%.” 
N. Factors Hindering the Liberalization Process 
“Beware the Japanese bearing gif白！ The liberalizat10n of Japan’s 
financial markets is often wrapped in白eguise of concession's to 
foreigners, but it is shrewdly crafted to derive maximum bene日ts
for the Japanese themselves ”ω 
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The mtemationalization of fin皿cew田 justone of m皿yunport阻 t
elements血atignited fmanc阻lliberalization in the domestic economy." 
And there is no doubt that without世tisextemal pressure, the pace of 
liberalization would have been even slower. But the p出narymoving 
forces came about from the ch四位宅配ononncenvironment wi吐tin
Jap血，岨dthe Japanese policymakers adjusted，訂1也eir・own time, the 
character of也eregulations to swt血eprevalling needs of Japan." 
羽田 con位medliberaliza世onof Japan’s financial markets is generally 
accepted as a foregone conclusion as laws and regulations restricting血e
free flow of capital are becommg things of the past. However, problems 
regarding acce田 tothe market will remaln for non-Japanese fmancial 
担凶加世onsas a result of血epeculiarities in the Japanese system. 
These so・calledinv1S1ble barriers are made known in a number of ways 
r四回ngfrom language and customs to relationships within the system. 
Federal Re曲目eBank of New York Chairm皿 GeraldCorrig皿 notes血at
“some observers would contend血atsかcalledmv1sible barriers m Japan 
are more of a problem也阻mthe case of o也erfmancial泊stitu世ons.”仰
Nevertheless，廿ieyare an integral part of the Japanese fmancial system. 
Main-Bank Relationship 
One such peculiarity of也eJapanese banking sys包mis the phenome-
non of the “mam-bank relat10n血ip.”百世s1s a remn岨 tof吐10highly 
regulated grow也 periodwhere tight controls reduced也eopp or旬niti田
for the corporate sector to utilize the services of a number of vanous 
financial institu世ons.As a result, borrowing and lending decisions were 
based on long-term relationships mstead of price competition白nongthe 
fm皿cial凪stitulions. 
Some economic wnters, and in partic叫arCrum皿dMeerschwam，” 
have argued that, while fmancial liberalization progre田es,the long-term 
relationships would be expected to breakdown as “血eseonce profitable 
relationships shぜtto a more flexible market onentation.”These market 
forces w丑I出回 serveas吐iemotivating factor m forcing Japanese re-
gulators to further liberalize也efmancial markets in line wi白血oseof 
New York and London. 
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A study by Akiyoshi Horiuchi and Frank Packer，凶 however,shows 
也atthe data do not support出 sconclus1on. The m剖nbank relat10nship 
system remains strong and secure despite advances m hberalization. 
De白1泊Ea m油1b叩kas being the largest single lender to a company for 
由epast three years, the authors found由atnearly 100% of血ecom-
pames listed on也efirst section of吐1eTokyo stock出 changehad a main 
bank And of those comp阻 ieshsted on吐iefirst section of the stock 
exchange between 1962 and 1967, 84 of 481 changed their main ba此，
or approximately 17 percent Between 1967-1972, 15 percent；叩dbe-
tween 1978-1983, 11 percent changed their main bank affiliation. Thus, 
the role of the main bank has not significantly din由ishedover time阻 d
rem田nsas a stabilizing force in the financial system. 
Lisa Martineau" states“al things being equal, the average Japanese 
company wil bank with a Japanese bank." She attributes由isto也e
conventional wisdom血atthe lending policies of the Japanese banks 
were responsible for the J ap四eseeconomic “miracle”of the postwar 
period. And for this reason, big corporations have remamed loyal to 
their Japanese ba此ers,thus impeding the ab出土yof foreign bankers to 
enter世田market.
Langi岨rgesand Customs 
The differences m language and customs, long deemed responSible for 
吐ieunique aspects in the Japanese system, also play a role in hindenng 
the development of the fmancial markets. But there continues to be con-
ilict concerning the extent of and the solu世onto the problem itself. 
Richard Holloway '" attnbutes certain weaknesses of Japan’s financial 
institutions to the fact that they are not internationally-minded enougli. 
Japanese financial institutions are accused of not utilizing世田 talentof 
foreign experts叩 ddo not place foreigners in positions of responsibility. 
In a s加丑arvem Japanese firms町ecriticized for not making 白＇tensive
use。f也eEnglish language even thougli English is也emultinational 
medium of busmess people. Holloway contends白atJapanese firms con-
tinue to remain mward-looking, a term which appears to be synonymous 
with being “too-Japanese.” 
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On吐ieother hand, a list of recommendations for American and o也er
foreign fmancial insti加世田sadvISes foreign banks and securities・ com・ 
p田uesto make greater efforts at ac伊irmgproficiency in吐ieJapanese 
language，阻dto obt厄nan in-depth understan也ngof the Japanese 
financial system. Historically, however, foreign executives, particularly 
American, have discounted the value of leaming Japanese, and this in 
the long run has proved to be to their detriment. 
According to Ohnishi," one strong reason for foreign executives to 
obtain fluency in the Jap回目elanguage is血atalmost al of也eM卸istiy
of Fm祖国’sreports阻 dannouncements are in Japanese. The necessity 
to have the Japanese translated mto English slows the flow of informa-
tion. And，“出evanous nu回目sof the Japanese language are also some-
tunes difficult to tr叩 slatemto English, creatmg further po阻 b出祖国
of misunderstanding.” 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The extent to which the Japanese fmancial markets wil liberalize in 
the fu旬開 C町田otbe predicted with certainty. There rem田nsa myriad 
of conflicts wi曲inthe domestic market, and each sector will seek to 
protect its own interests Regulation has long been a part of the Japanese 
fin阻 cialm町ke白血d由edere思血tionprocess w出 requireconcessions 
from al parties involved. Never血eles,if也efinancial markets of Japan 
are to tはetheir place alongside吐10seof London and New York, an in・ 
creasing number of market-opening measures must continue to be 
forthcommg. Fortunately the forces of change are becoming stronger 
eveiy day. 
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日本の金融自由化
その前途ーー
〈要約〉
デニス c.7 コーナック
第一次石油危機とプレトン・ウ yズ協定の崩壊は， 197日年代の経済環
境を大幅に変化させ，主要工業諸国の金融制度に大きな衝撃をあたえた。
日本の場合，増大する財政赤字を埋合せるための方策を探求する必要性
を課せられた当局は，金融自由化の実施をせまられることとなったので
ある。しかしながら，日本の金融自由化の速度は，日本が世界第一位の
債権固になったにもかかわらず，その経済上の取引相手国の速度に比し
て遅いものであった。本研究は，金融市場に発生したより重要な変化を
考察し，また日本の金融制度のいっそうの発展を阻害している要因を考
察することによって，この現象を解明しようとするものである。
筆者が結論として考えているものは，日本の金融の自由化が，国内市
場における無数の障害と各部門の自らの利益を守ろうとする動きによっ
てきまたげられているというものである。規制は長〈日本金融市場内特
性となっており，規制の緩和がより速やかな速度で行われるためには，
各方面の合意を将来においてとりつけることが必要なのである。
